“Turkish—American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957-63.” Middle Eastern Studies 46#3 (2010), pp. 433–455.
"The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963." Diplomatic History (2002) 26#1 pp 147–153. ===Historiography=== ===Primary sources=== Getchell, Michelle.
decided to launch a nuclear strike against the USSR, the latter would react by launching a retaliatory nuclear strike against the U.S. Additionally, placing nuclear missiles on Cuba was a way for the USSR to show their support for Cuba and support the Cuban people who viewed the United States as a threatening force, as the latter had become their ally after the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
"Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime" would occur in the first two weeks of October. ===Missile gap=== When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged "missile gap" with the Soviets leading.
Following the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960, it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force aircraft arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to explain than a CIA flight. When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying.
The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war. In response to the presence of American Jupiter ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey, and the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Cuba's request to place nuclear missiles on the island to deter a future invasion.
It would, for example, defy the Monroe Doctrine, a US policy limiting US involvement in European colonies and European affairs but holding that the Western Hemisphere was in the US sphere of influence. The Kennedy administration had been publicly embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961, which had been launched under President John F.
US covert operations against Cuba continued in 1961 with the unsuccessful Operation Mongoose. In addition, Khrushchev's impression of Kennedy's weaknesses was confirmed by the President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly to the building of the Berlin Wall.
In 1961, the Soviets had only four intercontinental ballistic missiles (R-7 Semyorka).
The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of 1962 (Crisis de Octubre), the Caribbean Crisis (Карибский кризис|Karibsky krizis|kɐˈrʲipskʲɪj ˈkrʲizʲɪs), or the Missile Scare, was a 1 month, 4 day (16 October – 20 November 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union which escalated into an international crisis when American deployments of missiles in Italy and Turkey were matched by Soviet deployments of similar ballistic missiles in Cuba.
An agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro in July 1962, and construction of a number of missile launch facilities started later that summer. Meanwhile, the 1962 United States elections were under way, and the White House denied charges for months that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles from Florida.
While the Soviets dismantled their missiles, some Soviet bombers remained in Cuba, forcing the Naval quarantine to stay in place until November 20 of that year. When all offensive missiles and the Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba, the blockade was formally ended on November 20, 1962.
In February 1962, the US launched an embargo against Cuba, and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government, mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September.
By October 1962, they may have had a few dozen, with some intelligence estimates as high as 75. The US, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more.
In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union.
A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965. Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs).
In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options.
According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire". === Deployment === In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana.
On October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that "under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba." As early as August 1962, the US suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba.
At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov, with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il-28 jet bomber fuselages. In September 1962, analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its ICBM bases, leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the island.
On November 2, 1962, Kennedy addressed the US via radio and television broadcasts regarding the dismantlement process of the Soviet R-12 missile bases located in the Caribbean region.
Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the Il-28s, the US government announced the end of the blockade from 6:45 pm EST on November 20, 1962.
The Soviets changed their minds, fearing possible future Cuban militant steps, and on November 22, 1962, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union Anastas Mikoyan told Castro that the rockets with the nuclear warheads were being removed as well. In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed "within a short time after this crisis was over".
Khrushchev held power for another two years. ==Nuclear forces== By the time of the crisis in October 1962, the total number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of each country numbered approximately 26,400 for the United States and 3,300 for the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev invited Norman Cousins, the editor of a major US periodical and an anti-nuclear weapons activist, to serve as liaison with President Kennedy, and Cousins met with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962. Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's proposals was lukewarm but Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security apparatus.
That caused Cuban–Soviet relations to deteriorate for years to come. ===US leadership=== The worldwide US Forces DEFCON 3 status was returned to DEFCON 4 on November 20, 1962.
Although Anderson was the only combatant fatality during the crisis, 11 crew members of three reconnaissance Boeing RB-47 Stratojets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were also killed in crashes during the period between September 27 and November 11, 1962.
Attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, they all learned that on October 27, 1962, had tracked and dropped signalling depth charges (the size of hand grenades) on , a Soviet Project 641 (NATO designation ) submarine.
He defused the seemingly intractable situation, which risked re-escalating the crisis, on November 22, 1962.
Castro was forced to give way and, much to the relief of Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet government, the tactical nuclear weapons were crated and returned by sea to the Soviet Union during December 1962. == In popular culture == The American popular media, especially television, made frequent use of the events of the missile crisis and both fictional and documentary forms.
Kennedy Cuba–Soviet Union relations Cuba–United States relations Soviet Union–United States relations DEFCON 2 conflicts DEFCON 3 conflicts 1962 establishments in Cuba 1962 disestablishments in Cuba 1960s in Cuba 1960s in the Soviet Union 1960s in the United States October 1962 events in North America United States involvement in regime change
In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options.
Under an operation code-named Operation Pot Pie, the removal of the Jupiters from Italy and Turkey began on 1 April and was completed by 24 April 1963.
Twenty-five years later, LeMay still believed that "We could have gotten not only the missiles out of Cuba, we could have gotten the Communists out of Cuba at that time." At least four contingency strikes were armed and launched from Florida against Cuban airfields and suspected missile sites in 1963 and 1964, although all were diverted to the Pinecastle Range Complex after the planes passed Andros island.
In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options.
Forty years later, McNamara said: Ellsberg said that Robert Kennedy (RFK) told him in 1964 that after the U-2 was shot down and the pilot killed, he (RFK) told Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, "You have drawn first blood ...
Twenty-five years later, LeMay still believed that "We could have gotten not only the missiles out of Cuba, we could have gotten the Communists out of Cuba at that time." At least four contingency strikes were armed and launched from Florida against Cuban airfields and suspected missile sites in 1963 and 1964, although all were diverted to the Pinecastle Range Complex after the planes passed Andros island.
A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965. Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs).
Kennedy's memoir of the crisis, posthumously released in 1969; It became the basis for numerous films and documentaries. The Missiles of October, 1974 TV docudrama about the crisis. The Fog of War, 2003 American documentary film about the life and times of former US Secretary of Defense Robert S.
Kennedy's memoir of the crisis, posthumously released in 1969; It became the basis for numerous films and documentaries. The Missiles of October, 1974 TV docudrama about the crisis. The Fog of War, 2003 American documentary film about the life and times of former US Secretary of Defense Robert S.
Sheldon Stern finds that a half century later there are still many "misconceptions, half-truths, and outright lies" that have shaped media versions of what happened in the White House during those harrowing two weeks. Historian William Cohn argued in a 1976 article that television programs are typically the main source used by the American public to know about and interpret the past.
In 1990, he reiterated that "it made no difference....
Although Castro was infuriated by Khrushchev, he planned on striking the US with remaining missiles if an invasion of the island occurred. In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had already received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and Il-28 bombers when the crisis broke.
Seven crew died when a Military Air Transport Service Boeing C-135B Stratolifter delivering ammunition to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base stalled and crashed on approach on October 23. ==Later revelations== Schlesinger, a historian and adviser to Kennedy, told National Public Radio in an interview on October 16, 2002 that Castro did not want the missiles, but Khrushchev pressured Castro to accept them.
Castro stated that he would have recommended their use if the US invaded despite Cuba being destroyed. Arguably, the most dangerous moment in the crisis was not recognised until the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference, in October 2002.
Kennedy's memoir of the crisis, posthumously released in 1969; It became the basis for numerous films and documentaries. The Missiles of October, 1974 TV docudrama about the crisis. The Fog of War, 2003 American documentary film about the life and times of former US Secretary of Defense Robert S.
In a 2010 interview, Castro expressed regret about his earlier stance on first use: "After I've seen what I've seen, and knowing what I know now, it wasn't worth it at all." Castro also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any US aircraft: the orders had been to fire only on groups of two or more.
Allison wrote: BBC journalist Joe Matthews published the story, on October 13, 2012, behind the 100 tactical nuclear warheads mentioned by Graham Allison in the excerpt above.
College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2012. Campus, Leonardo (2014).
The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis, Diplomatic History, January 2014, Volume 38, Number 1, pp. 137–81.
Article includes information from recently declassified sources. Powers, Thomas, "The Nuclear Worrier" (review of Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, , 420 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol.
1 (January 18, 2018), pp. 13–15. Seydi, SÜleyman.
Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents(Hackett Publishing, 2018) 200 pp.
Sherwin's Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York, Knopf, 2020), The New Yorker, 12 October 2020, pp. 70–73.
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