For example, Jerry Fodor (1980) argues for narrow content (although he comes to reject that view in his 1995), while David Chalmers (2002) argues for a two dimensional semantics according to which the contents of mental states can have both wide and narrow content. Critics of the view have questioned the original thought experiments saying that the lessons that Putnam and later writers such as Tyler Burge (1979, 1982) have urged us to draw can be resisted.
For example, Jerry Fodor (1980) argues for narrow content (although he comes to reject that view in his 1995), while David Chalmers (2002) argues for a two dimensional semantics according to which the contents of mental states can have both wide and narrow content. Critics of the view have questioned the original thought experiments saying that the lessons that Putnam and later writers such as Tyler Burge (1979, 1982) have urged us to draw can be resisted.
(See also DeRose, 1999.) If semantic externalism is true, then the meaning of a word or sentence is not wholly determined by what individuals think those words mean.
One way to use this in a response to skepticism is to apply the same strategy to the terms used in a skeptical argument in the following way (DeRose, 1999): To clarify how this argument is supposed to work: Imagine that there is brain in a vat, and a whole world is being simulated for it.
It involves the claim that our thoughts are about things, unlike a BIV's thoughts, which cannot be about things (DeRose, 1999). == Semantics == Semantic externalism comes in two varieties, depending on whether meaning is construed cognitively or linguistically.
(link) Fodor, Jerry (1980) "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:1. Fodor, Jerry (1995) The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics, Cambridge: MIT Press. Kornblith, Hilary (ed.) (2001) Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Blackwell Press. Lau, Joe (2004) "Externalism About Mental Content", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2004 Edition), Edward N.
Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N.
3, pp. 37–80. Brown, Curtis (2007) "Narrow Mental Content", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2007 Edition), Edward N.
Sosa, Knowledge In Perspective, Cambridge Press, pp. 131–145. Williams, Bernard (1981) "Internal and External Reasons", in Williams's Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–13. == External links == Internalism and Externalism – (draft) by Alberto Voltolini. Internalist Explorations of Meaning reading group at Harvard University, autumn 2007. Epistemological theories Justification (epistemology) Meta-ethics Ethical theories Semantics Theory of mind
All text is taken from Wikipedia. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License .
Page generated on 2021-08-05