In 1952–53, the US and Soviet Union detonated their first thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), far more powerful than the atomic bombs tested and deployed since 1945.
Between 1951 and 1958, the US conducted 166 atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union conducted 82, and Britain conducted 21; only 22 underground tests were conducted in this period (all by the US). ==Negotiations== ===Early efforts=== In 1945, Britain and Canada made an early call for an international discussion on controlling atomic power.
In all, 436 tests were conducted between the signing of the PTBT and 1 July 1973, compared to 499 tests between 16 July 1945 and the signing of the PTBT.
Bush unsuccessfully argued in 1952 that the US pursue a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union before testing its first thermonuclear weapon, but his interest in international controls was echoed in the 1946 Acheson–Lilienthal Report, which had been commissioned by President Harry S.
A version of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission as the Baruch Plan in June 1946.
At the same time, Macmillan linked British support for a test ban to a revision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (McMahon Act), which prohibited sharing of nuclear information with foreign governments.
Tsarapkin, a disarmament expert with experience dating back to the 1946 Baruch Plan.
Between 1947 and 1954, the US and Soviet Union discussed their demands within the United Nations Commission for Conventional Disarmament.
In 1947, he rejected arguments by Stafford L.
The Acheson–Lilienthal paper and Baruch Plan would serve as the basis for US policy into the 1950s.
France, which was in the midst of developing its own nuclear weapon, also firmly opposed a test ban in the late 1950s. The proliferation of thermonuclear weapons coincided with a rise in public concern about nuclear fallout debris contaminating food sources, particularly the threat of high levels of strontium-90 in milk (see the Baby Tooth Survey).
Ambrose writes that by early 1960, a test ban had become "the major goal of his President, indeed of his entire career," and would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country." Conversely, John Lewis Gaddis characterizes negotiations of the 1950s as "an embarrassing series of American reversals," suggesting a lack of real US commitment to arms control efforts.
In the 1950s, the Soviet Union assisted the Chinese nuclear program, but stopped short of providing China with an actual nuclear bomb, which was followed by increasingly tense relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
The technology for detecting underground tests has significantly improved since the 1950s and 1960s, with monitors detecting tests down to 1 kiloton with a high degree of confidence. ====Violations and accidents==== Early compliance with the PTBT was believed to be good, but there have been a number of accidental releases of nuclear debris into the atmosphere by parties to the treaty.
Between 1951 and 1958, the US conducted 166 atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union conducted 82, and Britain conducted 21; only 22 underground tests were conducted in this period (all by the US). ==Negotiations== ===Early efforts=== In 1945, Britain and Canada made an early call for an international discussion on controlling atomic power.
In 1952–53, the US and Soviet Union detonated their first thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs), far more powerful than the atomic bombs tested and deployed since 1945.
Bush unsuccessfully argued in 1952 that the US pursue a test ban agreement with the Soviet Union before testing its first thermonuclear weapon, but his interest in international controls was echoed in the 1946 Acheson–Lilienthal Report, which had been commissioned by President Harry S.
During the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger Adlai Stevenson, who ran in large part on support for a test ban. The British governments of 1954–58 (under Conservatives Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold Macmillan) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the US Congress approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested its first hydrogen bombs.
In 1954, the US Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll (part of Operation Castle) had a yield of 15 megatons of TNT, more than doubling the expected yield.
Between 1947 and 1954, the US and Soviet Union discussed their demands within the United Nations Commission for Conventional Disarmament.
A series of events in 1954, including the Castle Bravo test and spread of fallout from a Soviet test over Japan, redirected the international discussion on nuclear policy.
Additionally, by 1954, both US and Soviet Union had assembled large nuclear stockpiles, reducing hopes of complete disarmament.
Interest in nuclear control and efforts to stall proliferation of weapons to other states grew as the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities increased. ====After Castle Bravo: 1954–1958==== In 1954, just weeks after the Castle Bravo test, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the first call for a "standstill agreement" on nuclear testing, who saw a testing moratorium as a stepping stone to more comprehensive arms control agreements.
Warren's arguments were lent credence in the scientific community and public by the Castle Bravo test of 1954.
During the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger Adlai Stevenson, who ran in large part on support for a test ban. The British governments of 1954–58 (under Conservatives Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold Macmillan) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the US Congress approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested its first hydrogen bombs.
Support in the US public for a test ban to continue to grow from 20% in 1954 to 63% by 1957.
1955 marks the beginning of test-ban negotiations, as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev first proposed talks on the subject in February 1955.
On 10 May 1955, the Soviet Union proposed a test ban before the UN Disarmament Commission's "Committee of Five" (Britain, Canada, France, the Soviet Union, and the US).
The May 1955 proposal is now seen as evidence of Khrushchev's "new approach" to foreign policy, as Khrushchev sought to mend relations with the West.
In 1955, Mao Zedong expressed to the Soviet Union his belief that China could withstand a first nuclear strike and more than 100 million casualties.
During the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger Adlai Stevenson, who ran in large part on support for a test ban. The British governments of 1954–58 (under Conservatives Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold Macmillan) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the US Congress approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested its first hydrogen bombs.
Eisenhower, eager to mend ties with Britain following the Suez Crisis of 1956, was receptive to Macmillan's conditions, but the AEC and the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy were firmly opposed.
The proposal would serve as the basis of the Soviet negotiating position through 1957. Eisenhower had supported nuclear testing after World War II.
Support in the US public for a test ban to continue to grow from 20% in 1954 to 63% by 1957.
It was a combination of rising public support for a test ban and the shock of the 1957 Soviet Sputnik launch that encouraged Eisenhower to take steps towards a test ban in 1958. There was also increased environmental concern in the Soviet Union.
Rising Soviet concern was punctuated in September 1957 by the Kyshtym disaster, which forced the evacuation of 10,000 people after an explosion at a nuclear plant.
However; Kurchatov unsuccessfully called on Khrushchev to halt testing in 1958. On 14 June 1957, following Eisenhower's suggestion that existing detection measures were inadequate to ensure compliance, the Soviet Union put forth a plan for a two-to-three-year testing moratorium.
In 1961, Sakharov was part of the design team for a 50 megaton "clean bomb", which has become known as the Tsar Bomba, detonated over the island of Novaya Zemlya. In the spring of 1957, the US National Security Council had explored including a one-year test moratorium and a "cut-off" of fissionable-material production in a "partial" disarmament plan.
It was not until after Sputnik in late 1957 that Eisenhower quickly moved to expand nuclear collaboration with the UK via presidential directives and the establishment of bilateral committees on nuclear matters.
In early 1958, Eisenhower publicly stated that amendments to the McMahon Act were a necessary condition of a test ban, framing the policy shift in the context of US commitment to its NATO allies. In August 1957, the US assented to a two-year testing moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union, but required that it be linked to restrictions on the production of fissionable material with military uses, a condition that the Soviet Union rejected.
While Eisenhower insisted on linking a test ban to a broader disarmament effort (e.g., the production cut-off), Moscow insisted on independent consideration of a test ban. On 19 September 1957, the US conducted the first contained underground test at the Nevada Test Site, codenamed Rainier.
At one point, Eisenhower complained that "statecraft was becoming a prisoner of scientists." Until 1957, Strauss's AEC (including its Los Alamos and Livermore laboratories) was the dominant voice in the administration on nuclear affairs, with Teller's concerns over detection mechanisms also influencing Eisenhower.
Furthermore, Strauss repeatedly emphasized the risk of the Soviet Union violating a ban, a fear Eisenhower shared. On 7 November 1957, after Sputnik and under pressure to bring on a dedicated science advisor, Eisenhower created the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), which had the effect of eroding the AEC's monopoly over scientific advice.
In late 1957, the Soviet Union made a second offer of a three-year moratorium without inspections, but lacking any consensus within his administration, Eisenhower rejected it.
In October 1957, still feeling vulnerable from Anti-Party Group's ploy, Khrushchev forced out defense minister Georgy Zhukov, cited as "the nation's most powerful military man." On 27 March 1958, Khrushchev forced Bulganin to resign and succeeded him as Premier.
Between 1957 and 1960, Khrushchev had his firmest grip on power, with little real opposition. Khrushchev was personally troubled by the power of nuclear weapons and would later recount that he believed the weapons could never be used.
Between 1951 and 1958, the US conducted 166 atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union conducted 82, and Britain conducted 21; only 22 underground tests were conducted in this period (all by the US). ==Negotiations== ===Early efforts=== In 1945, Britain and Canada made an early call for an international discussion on controlling atomic power.
During the 1952 and 1956 presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger Adlai Stevenson, who ran in large part on support for a test ban. The British governments of 1954–58 (under Conservatives Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold Macmillan) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the US Congress approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested its first hydrogen bombs.
It was a combination of rising public support for a test ban and the shock of the 1957 Soviet Sputnik launch that encouraged Eisenhower to take steps towards a test ban in 1958. There was also increased environmental concern in the Soviet Union.
However; Kurchatov unsuccessfully called on Khrushchev to halt testing in 1958. On 14 June 1957, following Eisenhower's suggestion that existing detection measures were inadequate to ensure compliance, the Soviet Union put forth a plan for a two-to-three-year testing moratorium.
In 1958, at the request of Igor Kurchatov, Soviet nuclear physicist and weapons designer Andrei Sakharov published a pair of widely circulated academic papers challenging the claim of Teller and others that a clean, fallout-free nuclear bomb could be developed, due to the formation of carbon-14 when nuclear devices are detonated in the air.
London also encouraged the US to delay its disarmament plan, in part by moving the start of the moratorium back to November 1958.
In early 1958, Eisenhower publicly stated that amendments to the McMahon Act were a necessary condition of a test ban, framing the policy shift in the context of US commitment to its NATO allies. In August 1957, the US assented to a two-year testing moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union, but required that it be linked to restrictions on the production of fissionable material with military uses, a condition that the Soviet Union rejected.
In early 1958, the discord within American circles, particularly among scientists, was made clear in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Disarmament, chaired by Senator Hubert Humphrey.
In October 1957, still feeling vulnerable from Anti-Party Group's ploy, Khrushchev forced out defense minister Georgy Zhukov, cited as "the nation's most powerful military man." On 27 March 1958, Khrushchev forced Bulganin to resign and succeeded him as Premier.
In April 1958, the US began Operation Hardtack I as planned.
Following the Soviet declaration, Eisenhower called for an international meeting of experts to determine proper control and verification measures—an idea first proposed by British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. The advocacy of PSAC, including that of its chairmen James Rhyne Killian and George Kistiakowsky, was a key factor in Eisenhower's eventual decision to initiate test-ban negotiations in 1958.
In the spring of 1958, chairman Killian and the PSAC staff (namely Hans Bethe and Isidor Isaac Rabi) undertook a review of US test-ban policy, determining that a successful system for detecting underground tests could be created.
In explaining the policy shift, Eisenhower privately said that continued resistance to a test ban would leave the US in a state of "moral isolation." On 8 April 1958, still resisting Khrushchev's call for a moratorium, Eisenhower invited the Soviet Union to join these technical negotiations in the form of a conference on the technical aspects of a test-ban, specifically the technical details of ensuring compliance with a ban.
Khrushchev initially declined the invitation, but eventually agreed "in spite of the serious doubts" he had after Eisenhower suggested a technical agreement on verification would be a precursor to a test ban. On 1 July 1958, responding to Eisenhower's call, the nuclear powers convened the Conference of Experts in Geneva, aimed at studying means of detecting nuclear tests.
By the end of August 1958, the experts devised an extensive control program, known as the "Geneva System," involving 160–170 land-based monitoring posts, plus 10 additional sea-based monitors and occasional flights over land following a suspicious event (with the inspection plane being provided and controlled by the state under inspection).
In a widely publicized and well-received communiqué dated 21 August 1958, the conference declared that it "reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up ...
a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests." The technical findings, released on 30 August 1958 in a report drafted by the Soviet delegation, were endorsed by the US and UK, which proposed that they serve as the basis for test-ban and international-control negotiations.
Following Soviet assent on 30 August 1958 to the one-year moratorium, the three countries conducted a series of tests in September and October.
On 31 October 1958 the three countries initiated test-ban negotiations (the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests) and agreed to a temporary moratorium (the Soviet Union joined the moratorium shortly after this date).
This was rejected by Anglo-American negotiators due to fears that the verification provisions were too vague and the Geneva System too weak. Shortly after the Geneva Conference began in the fall of 1958, Eisenhower faced renewed domestic opposition to a comprehensive test ban as Senator Albert Gore Sr.
argued in a widely circulated letter that a partial ban would be preferable due to Soviet opposition to strong verification measures. The Gore letter did spur some progress in negotiations, as the Soviet Union allowed in late November 1958 for explicit control measures to be included in the text of the drafted treaty.
Khrushchev began the test-ban talks of 1958 with minimal prior discussion with China, and the two countries' agreement on military-technology cooperation was terminated in June 1959.
By March 1959, the negotiators had agreed upon seven treaty articles, but they primarily concerned uncontroversial issues and a number of disputes over verification persisted.
In early 1959, Wadsworth told Tsarapkin of new US skepticism towards the Geneva System.
This proposal was turned down on 23 April 1959 by Khrushchev, calling it a "dishonest deal." On 26 August 1959, the US announced it would extend its year-long testing moratorium to the end of 1959, and would not conduct tests after that point without prior warning.
The Soviet Union reaffirmed that it would not conduct tests if the US and UK continued to observe a moratorium. To break the deadlock over verification, Macmillan proposed a compromise in February 1959 whereby each of the original parties would be subject to a set number of on-site inspections each year.
In May 1959, Khrushchev and Eisenhower agreed to explore Macmillan's quota proposal, though Eisenhower made further test-ban negotiations conditional on the Soviet Union dropping its Control Commission veto demand and participating in technical discussions on identification of [nuclear explosion]s.
The US argued that the quota should be set according to scientific necessity (i.e., be set according to the frequency of seismic events). In June 1959, a report of a panel headed by Lloyd Berkner, a physicist, was introduced into discussions by Wadsworth.
Eisenhower issued a statement blaming "the recent unwillingness of the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific consideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection of underground nuclear explosions." Eisenhower simultaneously declared that the US would not be held to its testing moratorium when it expired on 31 December 1959, though pledged to not test if Geneva talks progressed.
Khrushchev began the test-ban talks of 1958 with minimal prior discussion with China, and the two countries' agreement on military-technology cooperation was terminated in June 1959.
Between 1957 and 1960, Khrushchev had his firmest grip on power, with little real opposition. Khrushchev was personally troubled by the power of nuclear weapons and would later recount that he believed the weapons could never be used.
The Soviet Union followed by reiterating its decision to not test as long as Western states did not test. In early 1960, Eisenhower indicated his support for a comprehensive test ban conditional on proper monitoring of underground tests.
On 11 February 1960, Wadsworth announced a new US proposal by which only tests deemed verifiable by the Geneva System would be banned, including all atmospheric, underwater, and outer-space tests within detection range.
In its own proposal offered 19 March 1960 the Soviet Union accepted most US provisions, with certain amendments.
The Soviet Union responded positively to the counterproposal and the research group convened on 11 May 1960.
In May 1960, there were high hopes that an agreement would be reached at an upcoming summit of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, and Charles de Gaulle of France in Paris. A test ban seemed particularly close in 1960, with Britain and France in accord with the US (though France conducted its first nuclear test in February) and the Soviet Union having largely accepted the Macmillan-Eisenhower proposal.
But US-Soviet relations soured after an American U-2 spy plane was shot down in Soviet airspace in May 1960.
Ambrose writes that by early 1960, a test ban had become "the major goal of his President, indeed of his entire career," and would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country." Conversely, John Lewis Gaddis characterizes negotiations of the 1950s as "an embarrassing series of American reversals," suggesting a lack of real US commitment to arms control efforts.
In the 1950s, the Soviet Union assisted the Chinese nuclear program, but stopped short of providing China with an actual nuclear bomb, which was followed by increasingly tense relations in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Albania, an ideological ally of China during the PTBT's enactment, also has not signed. ===Effectiveness=== The PTBT's ratification coincided with the beginning of a steep decline in the amount of radioactive particles in the atmosphere (following the "bomb spike" in the early 1960s), but it did not halt nuclear proliferation.
In the 1960s and the 1970s, China conducted 22 atmospheric tests and France conducted 50.
The technology for detecting underground tests has significantly improved since the 1950s and 1960s, with monitors detecting tests down to 1 kiloton with a high degree of confidence. ====Violations and accidents==== Early compliance with the PTBT was believed to be good, but there have been a number of accidental releases of nuclear debris into the atmosphere by parties to the treaty.
In 1961, the Soviet Union tested the Tsar Bomba, which had a yield of 50 megatons and remains the most powerful man-made explosion in history, though due to a highly efficient detonation fallout was relatively limited.
In 1961, Sakharov was part of the design team for a 50 megaton "clean bomb", which has become known as the Tsar Bomba, detonated over the island of Novaya Zemlya. In the spring of 1957, the US National Security Council had explored including a one-year test moratorium and a "cut-off" of fissionable-material production in a "partial" disarmament plan.
Paul Nitze would similarly suggest that Eisenhower never formulated a cohesive test ban policy, noting his ability to "believe in two mutually contradictory and inconsistent propositions at the same time." ===Renewed efforts=== Upon assuming the presidency in January 1961, John F.
Notably, early in his term, Kennedy also presided over a significant increase in defense spending, which was reciprocated by the Soviet Union shortly thereafter, thus placing the test-ban negotiations in the context of an accelerating arms race. On 21 March 1961, test-ban negotiations resumed in Geneva and Arthur Dean, a lead US envoy, offered a new proposal in an attempt to bridge the gap between the two sides.
In May 1961, Kennedy attempted via secret contact between Attorney General Robert F.
This was rejected by Khrushchev. Ahead of the June 1961 Vienna summit between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Robert F.
The Soviet Union would drop the general-disarmament demand in November 1961. ====Lifting the moratorium: 1961–1962==== Following the setback in Vienna and Berlin Crisis of 1961, as well as the Soviet decision to resume testing in August (attributed by Moscow to a changed international situation and French nuclear tests), Kennedy faced mounting pressure from the Department of Defense and nuclear laboratories to set aside the dream of a test ban.
In June 1961, following stalled talks in Geneva, Kennedy had argued that Soviet negotiating behavior raised "a serious question about how long we can safely continue on a voluntary basis a refusal to undertake tests in this country without any assurance that the Russians are not testing." Whether or not the Soviet Union had actually conducted secret tests was a matter of debate within the Kennedy administration.
Panofsky's findings were dismissed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as "assertive, ambiguous, semiliterate and generally unimpressive." Two weeks after the lifting of the Soviet moratorium in August 1961, and after another failed Anglo-American attempt to have the Soviet Union agree to an atmospheric-test ban, the US restarted testing on 15 September 1961.
In contrast to Soviet laboratories, US laboratories had been relatively inactive on nuclear weapons issues during the moratorium. In December 1961, Macmillan met with Kennedy in Bermuda, appealing for a final and permanent halt to tests.
On the side advocating resumption were the AEC, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Joint Chiefs of Staff (which had called for renewed atmospheric tests in October 1961), and Department of Defense, though then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara privately acknowledged that such tests were "not really necessary." Teller continued to advocate for atmospheric tests, as well, arguing in early 1962 that nuclear fallout was nothing be concerned about.
John Kenneth Galbraith, then the ambassador to India, had advised Kennedy in June 1961 that resumed testing "would cause us the gravest difficulties in Asia, Africa and elsewhere." Similarly, Hubert Humphrey described the moratorium as "a ray of hope to millions of worried people." Its termination, Humphrey warned, "might very well turn the political tides in the world in behalf of the Soviets." Ultimately, Kennedy sided with those arguing for resumed testing.
On 2 March 1962, building on the November 1961 announcement, Kennedy promised to resume atmospheric testing by the end of April 1962 if Moscow continued to resist the Anglo-American test-ban proposal.
Third, it was argued that the Soviet Union led the US in high-yield weapons (recall the Soviet Tsar Bomba test of 1961), which required atmospheric testing banned by the treaty, while the US led the Soviet Union in low-yield weapons, which were tested underground and would be permitted by the treaty.
In January 1962, Bethe, who had once supported a test ban, publicly argued that a ban was "no longer a desirable goal" and the US should test weapons developed by its laboratories.
Macmillan agreed to seek to give US permission "if the situation did not change." Christmas Island was ultimately opened to US use by February 1962. On this matter of resumed atmospheric tests, Kennedy lacked the full backing of his administration and allies.
On the side advocating resumption were the AEC, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Joint Chiefs of Staff (which had called for renewed atmospheric tests in October 1961), and Department of Defense, though then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara privately acknowledged that such tests were "not really necessary." Teller continued to advocate for atmospheric tests, as well, arguing in early 1962 that nuclear fallout was nothing be concerned about.
On 2 March 1962, building on the November 1961 announcement, Kennedy promised to resume atmospheric testing by the end of April 1962 if Moscow continued to resist the Anglo-American test-ban proposal.
On 27 August 1962, within that conference, the US and UK offered two draft treaties to the Soviet Union.
The alternative proposal included a partial test ban—underground tests would be excluded—to be verified by national detection mechanisms, without supervision by a supranational body. ====Cuban Missile Crisis and beyond: 1962–1963==== In October 1962, the US and Soviet Union experienced the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the two superpowers to the edge of nuclear war and prompted both Kennedy and Khrushchev to seek accelerated rapprochement.
After years of dormant or lethargic negotiations, American and British negotiators subsequently forged a strong working relationship and with Soviet negotiators found common ground on test restrictions later in 1962.
Khrushchev had been concerned by a partial ban due to the greater US experience in underground tests; by 1962, the US had conducted 89 such tests and the Soviet Union just two (the Soviet focus had been on cheaper, larger-yield atmospheric tests).
Khrushschev invited Norman Cousins, the editor of a major US periodical and an anti-nuclear weapons activist, to serve as liaison with President Kennedy, and Cousins met with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962.
Through Cousins' shuttle diplomacy in 1962 and 1963, the pontiff remained at the center of negotiations and helped ease misunderstandings between the two world leaders. Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's proposals was lukewarm but Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security apparatus.
However Kennedy pursued negotiations for a partial nuclear test ban. On 13 November 1962, Tsarapkin indicated that the Soviet Union would accept a proposal drafted by US and Soviet experts involving automated test detection stations ("black boxes") and a limited number of on-site inspections.
On 28 December 1962, Kennedy lowered the US demand to 8–10 stations.
The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) is the abbreviated name of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which prohibited all test detonations of nuclear weapons except for those conducted underground.
Though the PTBT did not halt proliferation or the arms race, its enactment did coincide with a substantial decline in the concentration of radioactive particles in the atmosphere. The PTBT was signed by the governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States in Moscow on 5 August 1963 before it was opened for signature by other countries.
The treaty formally went into effect on 10 October 1963.
Through Cousins' shuttle diplomacy in 1962 and 1963, the pontiff remained at the center of negotiations and helped ease misunderstandings between the two world leaders. Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's proposals was lukewarm but Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security apparatus.
On 19 February 1963, the number was lowered further to seven, as Khrushchev continued to insist on no more than three.
On 20 April 1963, Khrushchev withdrew support for three inspections entirely. Progress was further complicated in early 1963, as a group in the US Congress called for the Soviet proposal to be discarded in favor of the Geneva System.
On 27 May 1963, 34 US Senators, led by Humphrey and Thomas J.
That same spring of 1963, however, Kennedy had sent antinuclear activist Norman Cousins to Moscow to meet with Khrushchev, where he explained that the political situation in the US made it very difficult for Kennedy agree to a comprehensive ban with Khrushchev's required terms.
On 10 June 1963, in an effort to reinvigorate and recontextualize a test ban, President Kennedy dedicated his commencement address at American University to "the most important topic on earth: world peace" and proceeded to make his case for the treaty.
It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms.
In meetings prior to the negotiations, Kennedy informed Harriman that he would be willing to make concessions on the Berlin question. On 2 July 1963, Khrushchev proposed a partial ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, which would avoid the contentious issue of detecting underground tests.
Prior to the Moscow negotiations of the summer of 1963, Kennedy granted Harriman significant latitude in reaching a "Soviet-American understanding" vis-à-vis China.
Following the script of his 3 July 1963 speech, Khrushchev did not demand a simultaneous moratorium on underground testing and instead proposed a non-aggression pact.
At Harriman's insistence, this requirement was removed. The agreement was initialed on 25 July 1963, just 10 days after negotiations commenced.
Nevertheless, on 29 July 1963, France announced it would not join the treaty.
It was followed by China two days later. On 5 August 1963, British Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, Soviet foreign minister Gromyko, and US Secretary of State Dean Rusk signed the final agreement. ====After the Moscow agreement==== Between 8 and 27 August 1963, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the treaty.
Civil opposition to the deal was less prominent, though the Veterans of Foreign Wars announced opposition to the deal along with the International Council of Christian Churches, which rejected a "covenant with a godless power." Polling in late August 1963 indicated that more than 60% of Americans supported the deal while less than 20% opposed it. On 3 September 1963, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the treaty by a 16–1 vote.
On 24 September 1963, the US Senate voted 80–14 to approve ratification of the treaty, exceeding the necessary two-thirds majority by 14 votes.
On 10 October 1963, the treaty entered into effect. ==Implementation== ===Provisions=== The treaty declares as its "principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" and explicitly states the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban (one that bans underground tests).
Kennedy had warned in 1963 that without a test ban, there could be 10 nuclear states by 1970 and 15 to 20 by 1975. The decade following ratification of the PTBT (1963–1972) featured more US nuclear tests than the decade prior (1953–1962).
China and France, both nonsignatories, conducted 53 tests between 1963 and 1973.
have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country," per the US demand. ===Signatories=== By 15 April 1964, six months after the PTBT went into effect, more than 100 states had joined the treaty as signatories and 39 had ratified or acceded to it.
In addition to the NPT, the PTBT was followed within ten years by the Outer Space Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972.
The PTBT has been considered the stepping stone to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968, which explicitly referred to the progress provided by the PTBT.
Kennedy had warned in 1963 that without a test ban, there could be 10 nuclear states by 1970 and 15 to 20 by 1975. The decade following ratification of the PTBT (1963–1972) featured more US nuclear tests than the decade prior (1953–1962).
In the 1960s and the 1970s, China conducted 22 atmospheric tests and France conducted 50.
Through the end of the 1970s, the US, the UK, and Soviet Union reached agreement on draft provisions prohibiting all testing, temporarily banning PNEs, and establishing a verification system including on-site inspections.
Greenpeace was founded in 1971 in opposition to a planned underground test on the Alaskan island of Amchitka.
In addition to the NPT, the PTBT was followed within ten years by the Outer Space Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972.
In addition to the NPT, the PTBT was followed within ten years by the Outer Space Treaty and Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972.
China and France, both nonsignatories, conducted 53 tests between 1963 and 1973.
In all, 436 tests were conducted between the signing of the PTBT and 1 July 1973, compared to 499 tests between 16 July 1945 and the signing of the PTBT.
The last atmospheric test was conducted by China in 1980, after French atmospheric testing stopped in 1974.
In 1974, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibited underground tests with yields above 150 kilotons. In October 1977, the original parties to the PTBT renewed discussion of a comprehensive test ban in Geneva.
Kennedy had warned in 1963 that without a test ban, there could be 10 nuclear states by 1970 and 15 to 20 by 1975. The decade following ratification of the PTBT (1963–1972) featured more US nuclear tests than the decade prior (1953–1962).
In 1974, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibited underground tests with yields above 150 kilotons. In October 1977, the original parties to the PTBT renewed discussion of a comprehensive test ban in Geneva.
The last atmospheric test was conducted by China in 1980, after French atmospheric testing stopped in 1974.
However, the sides remained at odds over the precise details of verification, and the talks would permanently disband with the departure of President Jimmy Carter in 1981. Momentum towards a comprehensive ban re-emerged under Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan, with Gorbachev initiating a testing moratorium in 1985.
In 1982, a Greenpeace ship docked at Leningrad without permission to demand the Soviet Union to stop testing. The PTBT was a first of a series of nuclear arms control treaties in the second half of 20th century.
However, the sides remained at odds over the precise details of verification, and the talks would permanently disband with the departure of President Jimmy Carter in 1981. Momentum towards a comprehensive ban re-emerged under Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan, with Gorbachev initiating a testing moratorium in 1985.
In December 1986, the US indicated support for the "long-term objective" of a comprehensive ban, followed by the commencement of testing negotiations between the US and Soviet Union in November 1987.
In December 1986, the US indicated support for the "long-term objective" of a comprehensive ban, followed by the commencement of testing negotiations between the US and Soviet Union in November 1987.
In December 1987, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to a joint program of experiments on detecting underground tests.
In August 1988, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia petitioned to transform the PTBT into a comprehensive ban by extending the treaty to underground tests.
At a conference on the plan in January 1991, the US indicated that it would not permit efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban by consensus with amendments to the PTBT. Throughout the 1990s, progress accelerated towards a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).
At a conference on the plan in January 1991, the US indicated that it would not permit efforts to achieve a comprehensive ban by consensus with amendments to the PTBT. Throughout the 1990s, progress accelerated towards a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).
In September 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was signed and superseded the PTBT, but the PTBT is still in effect for states not party to the CTBT.
The most recent party to the PTBT is Montenegro, which succeeded to the treaty in 2006.
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