The zone headquarters also doubled as battalion headquarters, and acted as a supervisory element for elements of company and platoon size assigned to each of the country's twenty-nine administrative regions. The only concentration of troops in Conakry appeared to be the armoured battalion, with a modest number of Soviet medium tanks manufactured in the late 1940s, as well as Soviet APCs, and elements of the engineer battalion.
It is aided by the Republican Guard, which provides protection for government officials. ==History== Upon independence in 1958, France cut all ties and immediately began to repatriate Guinean soldiers serving in the French Army.
Indiscipline, criminality and impunity are rife, while working and living conditions for rank-and-file soldiers are deplorable.' ==Composition== ===Air Force=== After achieving independence from France in 1958, the Force Aerienne de Guinea was formed with Soviet assistance in the delivery of 10 MiG-17F fighters and two MiG-15UTI trainers.
By the end of January 1959 the new army had reached a strength of around 2,000 officers and soldiers. In February 1969, the Guinean government moved against the armed forces after alleging that a plot centred in Labé, the centre of the Fula (Peul|links=no; Fulɓe) homeland was planning to assassinate Toure and seize power, or, failing that, force the secession of Middle Guinea.
The force was formalized as the Popular Militia (Milices Populaires) in the early 1960s, given distinctive uniforms, and linked to the developing civic service, which was engaged on national development tasks.
The militia had grown out of a 1961 Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG) decision to create workplace 'committees for the defence of the revolution.' These committees were encouraged by party officials to report dishonest practices such as theft and embezzlement of funds which might 'endanger the achievements of the revolution.' The PDG youth arm, the Youth of the African Democratic Revolution (JRDA) was especially exhorted to report irregularities and crime to party or police authorities.
After 1966 it was consciously modeled after the Chinese Red Guards. In 1969, the militia was officially granted a role equivalent to the army, as a counterbalance in any military coup d'état.
By the end of January 1959 the new army had reached a strength of around 2,000 officers and soldiers. In February 1969, the Guinean government moved against the armed forces after alleging that a plot centred in Labé, the centre of the Fula (Peul|links=no; Fulɓe) homeland was planning to assassinate Toure and seize power, or, failing that, force the secession of Middle Guinea.
After 1966 it was consciously modeled after the Chinese Red Guards. In 1969, the militia was officially granted a role equivalent to the army, as a counterbalance in any military coup d'état.
After the plot, the army was regarded by the government as a centre of potential subversion, and the militia was developed as a counterforce to any military threat to the government. The army resisted the Portuguese invasion of Guinea in November 1970.
Purges that followed the 1970 invasion decimated the upper ranks of the army, with eight officers sentenced to death and 900 officers and men who had reached a certain age retired from active duty.
In the early 1970s the armed forces were organised into four military zones, corresponding to the four geographical regions (Lower Guinea, Middle Guinea, Upper Guinea, and Guinée forestière).
General Noumandian Keita, chief of the Combined Arms General Staff, was convicted and replaced by the army's chief of staff, Namory Kieta, who was promoted to general. In March 1971 elements of the Guinean military were deployed to Freetown in Sierra Leone after the Sierra Leonean President, Siaka Stevens, appeared to start losing his control of the Sierra Leonean military.
Stevens visited Conakry on 19 March 1971, and soon afterwards, around 200 Guinean soldiers were despatched to Freetown.
The last Guinean troops were withdrawn in 1974. In early 1975 the Guinean military consisted of an army of around 5,000, an air force of 300, and a naval component of around 200.
The last Guinean troops were withdrawn in 1974. In early 1975 the Guinean military consisted of an army of around 5,000, an air force of 300, and a naval component of around 200.
Makan Camara) Popular Militia Headquarters (Chef : Capitaine Mamadi Bayo ) ===The 1980s and Conté=== On 3 April 1984, following Touré's death, Lansana Conté, assistant chief of staff of the army, led a coup d'état which toppled the interim head of state.
Makan Camara) Popular Militia Headquarters (Chef : Capitaine Mamadi Bayo ) ===The 1980s and Conté=== On 3 April 1984, following Touré's death, Lansana Conté, assistant chief of staff of the army, led a coup d'état which toppled the interim head of state.
Conté had to suppress his first revolt in July 1985, by his immediate deputy, Colonel Diarra Traoré. Regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000–2001 attacks along the southern border by rebels acting as proxies for Liberia's Charles Taylor had important effects on the security forces.
Conté had to suppress his first revolt in July 1985, by his immediate deputy, Colonel Diarra Traoré. Regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000–2001 attacks along the southern border by rebels acting as proxies for Liberia's Charles Taylor had important effects on the security forces.
Conté, 'civilianised' since a rigged election in 1993, had to make significant concessions in order to save his regime.
Attacks by Taylor-backed rebels in 2000-01 were partially an attempt to stop this support. More serious was a 1996 attempted coup that originated as a military mutiny caused by the armed forces' poor living conditions.
After ECOMOG departed in 1997–98, the Guinean government began supporting the new Liberian rebel movement LURD.
Conté appointed his first civilian Minister of Defense in 1997. The military was used three times in 2006–2007 to suppress popular protest: in June 2006, resulting in 16 deaths, on 22 January 2007, when it fired on protesters at the 9 November Bridge in Conakry, killing over 100, and on 9 February 2007, when it killed several more protesters. The military suffered serious unrest in 2008.
Conté had to suppress his first revolt in July 1985, by his immediate deputy, Colonel Diarra Traoré. Regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000–2001 attacks along the southern border by rebels acting as proxies for Liberia's Charles Taylor had important effects on the security forces.
Attacks by Taylor-backed rebels in 2000-01 were partially an attempt to stop this support. More serious was a 1996 attempted coup that originated as a military mutiny caused by the armed forces' poor living conditions.
74, 19 December 2003. Dominique Bangoura, La Guinée, in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities, DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2011.
Conté appointed his first civilian Minister of Defense in 1997. The military was used three times in 2006–2007 to suppress popular protest: in June 2006, resulting in 16 deaths, on 22 January 2007, when it fired on protesters at the 9 November Bridge in Conakry, killing over 100, and on 9 February 2007, when it killed several more protesters. The military suffered serious unrest in 2008.
Conté appointed his first civilian Minister of Defense in 1997. The military was used three times in 2006–2007 to suppress popular protest: in June 2006, resulting in 16 deaths, on 22 January 2007, when it fired on protesters at the 9 November Bridge in Conakry, killing over 100, and on 9 February 2007, when it killed several more protesters. The military suffered serious unrest in 2008.
Conté appointed his first civilian Minister of Defense in 1997. The military was used three times in 2006–2007 to suppress popular protest: in June 2006, resulting in 16 deaths, on 22 January 2007, when it fired on protesters at the 9 November Bridge in Conakry, killing over 100, and on 9 February 2007, when it killed several more protesters. The military suffered serious unrest in 2008.
Probably the most recent definitive account on the security sector. Mohamed Tétémadi Bangoura, Dominique Bangoura, Gouvernance et réforme du secteur de la sécurité en Guinée: Défis démocratiques et de refondation, Editions L'Harmattan, 2010, , 9782296255449. Military of Guinea Guinea#Streitkräfte
74, 19 December 2003. Dominique Bangoura, La Guinée, in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa: Realities and Opportunities, DCAF/Lit Verlag, 2011.
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