Stimson Doctrine

1913

President Woodrow Wilson had refused to recognize the Mexican Revolutionary governments in 1913 and Japan's 21 Demands upon China in 1915. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931 placed Stimson in a difficult position.

1915

President Woodrow Wilson had refused to recognize the Mexican Revolutionary governments in 1913 and Japan's 21 Demands upon China in 1915. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931 placed Stimson in a difficult position.

1931

Stimson, United States Secretary of State in the Hoover administration (1929–1933), the policy followed Japan's unilateral seizure of Manchuria in northeastern China following action by Japanese soldiers at Mukden (now Shenyang), on September 18, 1931.

President Woodrow Wilson had refused to recognize the Mexican Revolutionary governments in 1913 and Japan's 21 Demands upon China in 1915. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931 placed Stimson in a difficult position.

1932

The policy was implemented by the United States federal government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932, to the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, of non-recognition of international territorial changes that were executed by force.

It was evident that appeals to the spirit of the Kellogg–Briand Pact had no impact on either the Chinese or the Japanese, and Stimson was further hampered by President Herbert Hoover's clear indication that he would not support economic sanctions as a means to bring peace in the Far East. On January 7, 1932, Stimson sent similar notes to China and Japan that incorporated a diplomatic approach that had been used by earlier secretaries facing crises in the Far East.

1933

"The Roosevelt Administration and Manchukuo, 1933–1941," Historian (Aug.

1935

4 (Dec., 1935), pp. 439–446 in JSTOR Foreign policy doctrines of the United States United States foreign relations legislation Soviet Union–United States relations 1933 in the United States 1933 in international relations Japan–United States relations

1940

The doctrine was also invoked by US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles in the Welles Declaration on July 23, 1940, which announced non-recognition of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania This remained the official US position until the Baltic states regained independence in 1991. It was not the first time that the US had used nonrecognition as a political tool or symbolic statement.

1954

3 (Apr., 1954), pp. 513–542 in JSTOR Findling, J.

1991

The doctrine was also invoked by US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles in the Welles Declaration on July 23, 1940, which announced non-recognition of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania This remained the official US position until the Baltic states regained independence in 1991. It was not the first time that the US had used nonrecognition as a political tool or symbolic statement.




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